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DEFENDANT'S RESTATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Is the request by the State for an evidentiary hearing

on the issue of "Waiver" irrelevant, given the Court's rule of per
se reversal wherever such dual representation is undertaken?
2.

Did the Court properly reach the "plain error" question

when it was raised in response to the State's argument of "waiver"?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND OF FACTS
Defendant accepts the statement contained in State's Petition
for Rehearing.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The State waived

the

issue of whether or not the

Defendant waived the conflict of his court-appointed part-time
prosecutor attorney by not raising it at an earlier time in these
lengthy proceedings. More importantly, the "inherent" conflict of
such dual representation including its subconscious effects on the
Defendant's attorney, the perception of impropriety, and its affect
1

on the public's confidence in the criminal justice system make a
case-by-case analysis of waiver futile and irrelevant.
2.

The State is seeking to have the Court circumscribe its

discretion in its application of the plain error doctrine by
requiring a Defendant to anticipate a State's affirmative response
of

"waiver."

To

so

bind

and

limits

its

discretion would

substantially defeat the purpose of the plain error doctrine.
INTRODUCTION
The Court has not overlooked relevant facts or authority, nor
misapplied the law.

Point 1 of the State seeks to avoid, through

the back door, a per se rule announced by the court in this case.
Point

II of

the

State

seeks

to

substantially

decrease

the

discretion of this Court in its application of the plain error
rule.
POINT I
BECAUSE THE CONFLICT OF A PART-TIME CITY PROSECUTOR IN
REPRESENTING A DEFENDANT IS "INHERENT," THE STATE'S
WAIVER ARGUMENT IS IRRELEVANT.
The State has produce an affidavit of Thomas Willmore, the
part-time prosecutor who represented the Defendant at trial, which
indicates that in November, 1989 (approximately 3 months prior to
trial in February, 1990), Mr. Willmore advised the Defendant that
he was a prosecutor

for the City of Tremonton.

The State,

contending that this is not a fact it is seeking to establish,
nevertheless requests an evidentiary hearing to establish this
fact. Implicit in its request is the argument that if Mr. Willmore
2

had ever informed the Defendant of his status, the Defendant waived
the conflict by not bringing it to the trial court's attention.
The Court correctly stated that "there is no evidence in the
record that Brown knew of Willmore's status as a city prosecutor."
(Brown, slip op. at 7.)

The State had ample opportunity to raise

this issue in appeal and declined to do so.

Neither in the Brief

of Appellee nor in subsequent proceedings including Appellant's
Motion to Supplement the Record and the hearing on the Court's
Notice Of Opportunity To Be Heard on the issue of judicial notice
of Thomas Willmore's employment as a city prosecutor did the State
propose that a waiver had occurred.

The State did not object to

the Court's proposal of judicial notice making it clear, however,
that it was asking the Court to follow the dissent in People v.
Rhodes, 115 Cal. Rptr. 235, 524 P.2d 3663 (1974) in requiring the
Defendant to demonstrate "actual prejudice" rather than follow the
majority

analysis

finding

"inherent

prejudice."

(State's

Supplemental Memorandum on Judicial Notice Issue, pp. 2, 3). The
State has waived its "waiver" issue by not having raised it at any
earlier point in the extended proceedings on the "conflict" issue
in this appeal.
More importantly, however, the State's argument of waiver and
request for an evidentiary hearing to establish such waiver is not
congruent with the court's ruling of an "inherent conflict."
An analysis of the Court's opinion readily demonstrates that
the conflict is not and should not be waivable.

The conflict

pertains not only to readily observable and obvious factors that
3

could afford a Defendant the opportunity to make a "knowing and
intelligent" waiver, but also pertains to the very core, "the vital
interests

of

the

criminal

justice

system

[that]

are

jeopardized...." (Brown, slip op. p. 7).
To begin with, we have the divided loyalties of the attorney,
a

disinclination

to

vigorously

cross-examine

law

enforcement

officers, a hesitancy to attack the constitutionality of laws he
is sworn to uphold, and other perhaps unconscious influences caused
by the divided loyalty.
The relationship between the Defendant and his advocate can
be compromised because of a natural hesitation to confide fully in
a prosecutor.

This may be experience as no more than a vague

uneasy feeling and could not be identified sufficiently for a
knowing and intelligent waiver.
Then there is the factor that "dual representation erodes
public confidence in the criminal justice system." (Brown, slip op.
p. 10). This includes the appearance of impropriety, perception
of use of connections and influence, and concern about effect of
alienation of law enforcement agencies on future prosecution.
The Court's analysis concludes with a per se rule of reversal
in such conflicts rather than a case-by-case inquiry to weigh
actual prejudice.

The waiver inquiry which the State requests be

undertaken in this case invites just such a case-by-case analysis
that this Court has rejected.

The Court has correctly recognized

the fallacy of such an analysis.

In the instant case, the State

is requesting to make a record of what may have been said, thought,
4

and understood by Mr. Willmore and the Defendant in 1989, more than
three years ago.

Even if it were concluded that the Defendant

fully understood and appreciated the future impact that the dual
representation presented to him and his case (but it is anticipated
that the Defendant would say he neither heard nor appreciated the
alleged statement), the Defendant could hardly waive the impact on
the public's interest in the integrity of the criminal justice
system.
The Court's rejection of case-by-case analysis precludes the
State's request for an evidentiary hearing.
POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY ADDRESSED THE DEFENDANT'S
ERROR" ARGUMENT.
The

State

is

urging

the

Court

to

"PLAIN

circumscribe

the

discretionary authority to avoid injustice under the "plain error"
principle which it presently has.
In the instant case, at trial the Defendant made an objection
to offered evidence of prior bad acts on the grounds that it was
beyond the scope of cross-examination, without also mentioning that
it was improper under rules 404 and 405 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.

When the latter was raised on appeal as the more

accurate and meaningful ground for the objection and error at
trial, the State countered with its affirmative defense of a
"waiver," thus avoiding any analysis of a rule 404 or 405 error.
Defendant then countered the "waiver" argument by asserting "plain
error."
5

The Court has used the "plain error" doctrine up to the
present as a discretionary tool "to permit [the court] to avoid
injustice." State vs. Eldridqe, 773 P.2d 29, ftnt. 8, p. 35 (Utah,
1989).

The State is asking the Court to limit its flexibility in

using this tool by requesting a rule that a Defendant anticipate
a State's "waiver" argument and raise the "plain error" argument
in its initial brief.
Under RCP 8 (c), "waiver" is an affirmative defense.

A

Plaintiff is not obligated to anticipate such a response in its
initial pleading.

Similarly, while a Defendant-Appellant may at

times be able to anticipate such a response by the State, it is
certainly

not

clear

that

such

a

response

could

always

be

anticipated, and it would be a serious mistake to limit this
Court's discretion by denying it the "plain error" tool where the
Defendant didn't properly anticipate a "waiver" argument by the
State.
The

State

further

argues

that

the

Court's

rule

that

substantive legal issues, such as a state constitutional basis for
an alleged error must be raised in the initial brief, should be
extended to require that a procedural type issue such as plain
error be raised in the initial brief.
distinguishable.

The two are clearly

First, the substantive basis for error does not

involve the anticipation of an affirmative avoidance of an issue
by

the

State

such

as

"waiver."

Second,

an

analysis

of

constitutional law would usually be expected to be more extensive
and complex than a "plain error" analysis.
6

The State cannot assert that it had no opportunity to respond
to Defendant's "plain error" argument. Just as it argues that the
Defendant could have anticipated its "waiver" argument, the State
could have anticipated the "plain error" argument in its Brief of
Appellee.

In addition, it could have requested leave of court to

file a further brief
analysis.

URAP 24(c).

if it felt the issue required written
Finally counsel for the State had the

opportunity and did in fact argue against application of the "plain
error" rule in oral argument. (See Pet. for Rehearing, p. 7).
The "plain error" principle is one that the Court has created
to avoid injustice when an otherwise strict application of court
rules would result in such injustice.

It would be the ultimate

irony if this Court were to circumscribe this rule with technical
requirements such as that espoused by the State.

It would no

longer retain the broad discretion inherent to the purpose of the
rule.
CONCLUSION
The Court should deny the request for a rehearing. The matter
should be immediately remitted to District Court for the new trial
ordered in the opinion of November 30, 1992.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

j?5

day of February, 1993.
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